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Monica and Bill All the Time and Everywhere 
The Collapse of Gatekeeping and Agenda Setting in the New Media Environment 
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This article argues that by providing virtually unlimited sources of political information, the new media 
environment undermines the idea that there are discrete gates through which political information passes: If 
there are no gates, there can be no gatekeepers. The difficulty of elites (political and media both) and 
academics in understanding the Lewinsky scandal stems from their failure to recognize the increasingly limited 
ability of journalists to act as gatekeepers. The disjuncture between elite attempts to both control and 
understand the scandal on one hand and the conclusions the public drew about this political spectacle on other 
hand speaks to some fundamental changes that have occurred in the role of the press in American society in the 
late 20th century. 
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In this article, we use the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal to illustrate a fundamental change in 
the contemporary American media environment: the virtual elimination of the gatekeeping 
role of the mainstream press.1 Although most current understanding of media and politics 
(held by scholars, citizens, and practitioners) assumes that journalists can and/or should 
operate as the gatekeeper for politically relevant information, the most profound impact of 
the new media environment may well be the way it undermines the ability of any elite to play 
this central role. The new media environment by providing virtually unlimited sources of 
political information (although these sources do not provide anything like an unlimited 
number of perspectives) undermines the idea that there are discrete gates through which 
political information passes: If there are no gates, there can be no gatekeepers. Although we 
are certainly not the first to note the changing role of journalists in this new media 
environment (see most notably, E. Katz, 1993), we believe that the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal 
illustrates how fundamental is this particular change in the role of the press. 
We argue that although elites (political and media both) and academics on one hand had 
a great deal of trouble making sense of Monica and Bill, the public on the other hand seems 
to have had much less difficulty. We contend that the former groups’ difficulty in 
understanding the scandal stems from their failure to recognize the increasingly limited 
ability of journalists to act as gatekeepers. The disjuncture between elite attempts to both 
control and understand the scandal on one hand and the conclusions the public drew about 
this political spectacle on the other hand speaks to some fundamental changes that have 
occurred in the role of the press in American society as we move into the 21st century. 
Writing as we are at a time when the national agenda is focused on profound issues of 
war with Iraq, terrorism, and economic crisis, it may seem trivial to focus on the scandals of 
what now seems like a bygone age of pre-9/11 innocence. Nevertheless, we think that the 
Clinton-Lewinsky scandal still bears scrutiny because of what it revealed about the changing 
structure of the media environment within which political issues now play out in the United 
States. In short, these changes are not simply characteristics of the media coverage of 
political scandals but all issues on the political agenda. 
This article is part of a larger project in which we try to make sense not just of Monica 
and Bill but also of the alterations in the media environment over the past 15 years and the 
implications of these changes for the role of the media in American politics. We argue that 
alterations in the media environment have eroded the always uneasy distinction between 
news and entertainment. Overall, this erosion, one result of which is the collapse of the 
gatekeeping function, is rapidly undermining the commonsense assumptions used by elites, 
citizens, and scholars to understand the role of the media in a democratic society. As scholars 
and citizens ourselves, we are divided over the implications of these changes for the state of 
American democracy. Optimistically, we believe that the erosion of elite gatekeeping and the 
emergence of multiple axes of information provide new opportunities for citizens to 
challenge elite control of political issues. Pessimistically, we are skeptical of the abilities of 
ordinary citizens to make use of these opportunities and suspicious of the degree to which 
even multiple axes of power are still shaped by more fundamental structures of economic and 
political power. 
In making our argument, we try to avoid the twin pitfalls of either seeing these changes 
as so profound and revolutionary that they fundamentally alter the political world or of 
seeing them as incremental extensions of age-old features of politics, hence signifying 
nothing new. In his own analysis of television and journalism, Pierre Bourdieu (1998/1998) 
saw these pitfalls as two symmetrical illusions to which social scientists are prone (and that 
ironically are made more tempting by the desire of academics to publicize their views in the 
mass media): 
 
On the one hand, there is the sense of something that has never been seen before. (There are sociologists 
who love this business, and it’s very much the thing, especially on television, to announce the appearance of 
incredible phenomena or revolutions.) And, on the other hand (mostly from conservative sociologists), there’s 
the opposite, “the way it always has been,” “there’s nothing new under the sun,” “there’ll always be people on 
top and people on the bottom,” “the poor are always with us; and the rich too.” (p. 43) 
 
THE THEORETICAL CENTRALITY OF GATEKEEPING 
 
 To understand how significant is the erosion of the gatekeeping role, it is first necessary 
to show how important this idea is to extant theories of the press and political 
communications research. An especially influential conceptualization of the role of the press 
in postwar American society called the social responsibility theory was formulated by 
Theodore Peterson (1956). Responding to a variety of social, political, and economic changes 
in the postwar era, Peterson sought to reconcile the growing centralization of ownership and 
decreasing competition in the printed press, the rise of an inherently centralized and 
expensive electronic media, and social science research and real-world events that raised 
concerns regarding the stability of democratic systems and the civic capacity of democratic 
citizens (Berelson, 1952; Schumpeter, 1942). 
 This new theory introduced (or reinforced) three significant conceptual distinctions. First, 
the news media was separated from entertainment media, with the former viewed as most 
directly responsible for fulfilling the media’s civic functions. Second, within the news media, 
fact would be distinguished from opinion and news reporting would strive to be accurate, 
objective, and balanced. Third and most significant for this article, reflecting arguments 
made much earlier by Lippmann (1922), the public was distinguished from media elites and 
policy experts, with the former viewed as generally passive, easily manipulated consumers of 
information and the latter as information gatekeepers who represented the public’s interest in 
the construction of political and social reality. 
In essence, the social responsibility theory conceded the inevitability of both a 
centralized, privately owned media and of a less-than-engaged public and transferred much 
of the civic responsibility of the latter to a new class of information elites. The “truth” about 
the social and political world was no longer (if indeed it had ever been) constructed out of 
enlightened public discourse but instead emerged from a more managed and limited 
exchange among experts in the news media. Citizens were redefined as unsophisticated 
consumers of information, and the public was redefined as an audience. 
The ability to maintain these distinctions and institutionalize professional journalists as 
political gatekeepers was aided from the 1950s through the early 1980s by the relative lack of 
competition that had led to the development of the social responsibility theory in the first 
place. For example, during this period, television viewers had the choice of watching one to 
five channels, most or all of which broadcast news at the same time. The distinction of news 
from non-news was also preserved by the underlying assumption that public affairs 
programming would be free from the expectations of profitability. And it was somewhat 
ironically maintained by the nature of the audience itself. Readers of prestige news 
magazines and newspapers and viewers of public affairs broadcasting were a self-selected 
segment of the population, a more elite social, economic, and political strata of citizens. This 
elite audience signaled the serious nature of the content, distinguishing it from “popular” 
media. What developed were distinctions between the politically important and the politically 
insignificant based not on analyses of the actual political content and aesthetic worth of 
media programming but rather on the organization of producing institutions and the make-up 
of the audience. 
Political communications researchers have wrestled with the implications of the 
emergence of this media formation. They have found that consistent with social 
responsibility theories of the press, the political agenda has been shaped by the symbiotic 
relationship that has developed between mainstream political actors and major news outlets 
(Bennett, 1988; Hallin, 1986). In this relationship, the mainstream news media acted as a 
monolithic gatekeeper while a limited set of political elites vied with each other to shape this 
agenda and how it was framed. Within this system, the public was often reduced to a passive 
consumer whose own attention to and interpretation of events was constrained by this limited 
information environment. 
The degree to which public opinion is actually shaped by the outcome of this elite 
struggle has been explored by a generation of scholars. Employing a wide variety of 
increasingly sophisticated empirical methods, mainstream political communications 
researchers have found powerful and convincing evidence that the media acting as 
gatekeepers exercise significant influence on public opinion (e.g., Iyengar, 1994; Iyengar & 
Kinder, 1987; Page & Shapiro, 1992). However, it is important to recognize that this work 
assumes a particular model of the media environment described by the social responsibility 
theory of the press within which elites and citizens operate. If this environment has changed 
as we argue, then so too must our evaluations of this body of research: It is perhaps 
historically accurate but of limited relevance today. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that this 
model of political communication, despite its relatively brief duration (the “golden age” of 
network news lasted only 20 years or so), has been taken by so many as the natural state of 
affairs against which all other models are judged.2 After outlining the changes in the media 
environment that undermine both the social responsibility theory of the press and the role of 
media as gatekeepers, we use the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal to sketch the changing nature of 
the impact of the media on public opinion. 
One result of the acceptance of the social responsibility theory of the press has been that 
most scholars of political communication tended to ignore the political implications of 
non-news genres: movies, television drama and comedies, music, and so forth. Pointing out, 
as we do in the balance of this article, the political relevance of a wide variety of media is not 
a claim that such genres have only become politically important in the new media 
environment. In the 1960s and 1970s, Hollywood movies such as Dr. Stranglelove, 
Apocalypse Now, and Easy Rider were important political texts for a large segment of the 
public. Similarly, novels such as Catch 22, Slaughterhouse Five, or Gravity’s Rainbow 
became important conduits for communicating a variety of political values and perspectives 
given short shrift in the news. Our point is that such media have always been politically 
relevant, it was only the a priori assumptions of media scholars that prevented them from 
fully understanding this political significance. 
 
THE CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT AND THE BREAKDOWN OF 
GATEKEEPING 
 
 The media environment in the United States has changed dramatically in the past 15 
years with the expansion of cable and satellite television, the growth of the Internet and 
World Wide Web, the horizontal and vertical integration of the media through conglomerates, 
the general availability of VCRs and remote television controls, and so forth. The new media 
environment is distinctive in several ways: the increased volume of information that is 
available; the increased speed with which information can be gathered, retrieved, and 
transmitted; the increased control given to consumers of the media; the fragmentation of 
media audiences and the resulting greater ability to target media messages to particular 
audiences; the greater decentralization of certain aspects of the media; and the greater 
interactive capacity between consumers and producers of media messages (Abramson, 
Arterton, & Orren, 1988; J. Katz, 1997). All told, these changes constitute a reshaping of the 
media environment that easily rivals those leading to the creation of the social responsibility 
theory and the structural development of the media as gatekeeper. 
 The aforementioned changes have made it difficult to maintain the always artificial 
distinction between public affairs and “mere” entertainment. Specifically, there has been an 
erosion of the walls constructed between the two types of media. 
 The division of media organizations into separate news, entertainment, and sports 
divisions, although still in place, has become more porous. Journalists, management 
executives, public officials, and entertainers develop celebrity identities that transcend any 
specific genre and allow them to move freely between these different genres. The distinction 
between fact and opinion or analysis is much less clearly identified by simple rules such as 
where it appears, who is saying it, or how it is labeled. Public affairs time slots have become 
overwhelmed by the range of options open to citizens: Traditional news can be gotten any 
time of the day through cable or the World Wide Web or equally ignored at any time of the 
day. Even the informal standard operating procedures, routines, and beats that determined 
newsworthiness have come under serious rethinking both from within and outside the 
journalistic profession (Rosen, 1999). As audiences themselves absorb these changes and the 
erosion of formerly commonsense distinctions, they too begin to move freely between genres, 
eroding the gatekeeping ability of any single group of elites (e.g., “serious” journalists or 
political leaders). 
 The mainstream press in its gatekeeping role operates along a single axis of influence 
determined by the interaction between political elites and journalists. This point of 
interaction constitutes the gate through which information passes to the public. However, the 
new media environment disrupts the single axis system in three ways. First, the expansion of 
politically relevant media and the blurring of genres lead to a struggle within the media itself 
for the role of authoritative gatekeeper. Second, the expansion of media outlets and the 
obliterating of the normal news cycle have created new opportunities for nonmainstream 
political actors to influence the setting and framing of the political agenda (Kurtz, 1998). And 
third, this changed media environment has created new opportunities and pitfalls for the 
public to enter and interpret the political world. E. Katz (1993) for example in writing about 
media coverage of the Gulf War noted that 24-hour cable news outlets not only gathered 
news as rapidly as possible but also broadcast it as rapidly as possible, effectively eliminating 
the role of editors in the news production process. This left viewers themselves to try to sort 
out what was “really” happening as the war progressed. 
 In short, the new media environment creates a multiplicity of gates through which 
information passes to the public both in terms of the sheer number of sources of information 
(i.e., Internet, cable television, radio), the speed with which information is transmitted, and 
the types of genres the public uses for political information (i.e., movies, music, docudramas, 
talk shows). These changes create what John Fiske (1996) called multiaxiality that 
“transforms any stability of categories into the fluidities of power” (p. 65). Whereas Fiske 
focused on three axes of class, race, and gender in his analysis, the concept of multiaxiality is 
useful for understanding the changing nature of mediated political discourse more generally. 
So, in this new media environment, myriad gates through which information passes create 
multiple axes of power to influence public opinion. 
 In one sense, multiaxiality is similar to older libertarian models of the press. In these 
pre-20th-century models, relatively unfettered opportunity for privately owned presses and 
few limits on what they published were assumed to foster a market place of ideas. Although 
the range and quality of information available through the press was an important element of 
this libertarian theory of the press (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956), equally important 
(though less often articulated) was the belief that citizens had the ability, opportunity, and 
motivation to actively participate in the civic and cultural marketplace. Just as classical 
economic theory assumed an informed and rational consumer, so too libertarian press theory 
assumed a citizenry able to sort through and draw rational conclusions from the booming, 
buzzing confusion of the marketplace of ideas. In addition, the libertarian theory made few 
distinctions between popular and elite information, between fact and opinion, between the 
entertaining and the informative, or between culture and politics. The “truth” about the social 
and political world did not emerge from the pages of newspapers and pamphlets but was 
constructed and constantly revisited through the interaction of popular information and 
popular discourse. 
 Yet, the new multiaxial media environment is also quite different from earlier models of 
the press and media influence, primarily because of the centrality and omnipresence of the 
media itself. Libertarian and social responsibility theories of the press assumed either 
explicitly or implicitly that the political values citizens use to interpret information and the 
information itself come from a wide variety of sources of which the media itself is only one. 
Much empirical communications research (often bundled together and labeled the minimal 
effects model) supports these assumptions by finding that the media exercise only limited 
influence over basic political values (as evidenced by the research on political socialization 
that operates through family, school, friends, coworkers, etc.) and that due to limited interest, 
media messages are filtered (via the two-step flow) through an attentive elite. This neat 
distinction between the media and life outside the media is another casualty of the new media 
environment. When we spend so much of our day attending to the mediabe it watching 
television, videotapes, and movies; cruising the Internet; playing video games; listening to 
music and radio; and so forthlife “on the screen” is no longer distinct from life “out there.” 
Increasingly, the media in all its new forms is where we live. To paraphrase Marshall 
McLuhan (1995), the new media are not bridges between people and life; they are life. The 
new media are not ways of relating us to “real” life; they are real life and they reshape real 
life at will.3 It seems to us that this creates a fundamentally new set of challenges for 
citizenship and democracy unimagined by older theories of the press or much 
communications research. 
 At one level, the collapse of gatekeeping represents a direct attack on the elites 
(journalists, policy experts, public officials, academics, etc.) who have served as the arbiters 
of social and political meaning under the social responsibility theory. To some extent, this 
responsibility is returning to the public as they play a more active role in constructing social 
and political meaning out of the mix of mediated narratives with which they are presented. 
We find much evidence of this in the public’s ability to make sense of the Clinton-Lewinsky 
scandal. But in other ways, the media remains elite dominated, and the changes described 
earlier are simply alterations in the rules of the game, creating new venues through which 
traditional political elites attempt to shape the political agenda in new ways. How able 
citizens are to search for diverse sources of information and critically evaluate what they find 
is a troubling question. We illustrate these contradictory tendencies and the pressing need for 
a new theory of the press that accounts for them by examining the Lewinsky-Clinton media 
spectacle. 
 
 
SEX, LIES, AND VIDEOTAPES: A CASE STUDY OF THE NEW MEDIA POLITICS 
 
 The Clinton-Lewinsky scandal was the last in a long series of “bimbo eruptions” that had 
plagued Bill Clinton throughout his political career.4 The declining ability of political elites 
and the mainstream press to act as gatekeepers along with the increasing role of alternative 
media sources can be chronicled by comparing the responses of the Clinton campaigns and 
administrations (assuming there is any longer a difference between those two terms) and the 
mainstream press to each successive accusation leveled by first Connie Hamzey, then 
Gennifer Flowers, then Paula Jones, then Kathleen Willey, and finally Monica Lewinsky. 
Although we focus here on Bill Clinton, it would also be interesting to analyze why 
allegations about his behavior became a staple of a wide variety of media outlets and 
American public discourse while allegations about other politicians (e.g., long-running 
rumors about George Bush and Newt Gingrich) did not cross the threshold into widely 
circulated stories or public discussion.5 Clearly, there is room for a comparative sociology of 
modern sex scandals and their coverage in the mass media.  
Establishing a pattern that would repeat itself many times, the first allegations about Bill 
Clinton surfaced in alternative media outlets. In November of 1991, a Little Rock talk radio 
station aired accusations made by Connie Hamzey (whose previous claim to fame had been 
that she was a well-known rock and roll groupie) that she had been propositioned by then 
Governor Bill Clinton in 1983. Hamzey’s accusations were originally made as part of a 
Penthouse story about her that by the way also included nude photos.6 Hamzey’s story was 
picked up by CNN Headline News. 
The Clinton campaign’s response reflected the then still relatively intact world of elite 
gatekeeping. Senior advisor George Stephanopoulos deployed his “People will think you are 
scum” strategy, later to be immortalized in the “documentary” The War Room.7 This 
approach relies on two features of mainstream journalistic practice: ethical concerns over the 
propriety or covering the private lives of public figures and the need for on-the-record 
sources on both sides of a story. So, while refusing to go on the record to even deny the 
charges (as this would then provide two sides to the story and make it a legitimate topic), 
Stephanopoulos called CNN and “started screaming” about the propriety of the story while 
refusing to comment to other reporters who called. Tellingly, this strategy also relies on the 
ability or the mainstream press to act as the primary conduit or political information to the 
public. “It worked. CNN dropped the story after a single mention, and none of the other 
networks picked it up….We’d survived our first bimbo eruption” (Stephanopoulos, 1999, p. 
55). By 1998 and the Lewinsky scandal, none of these underlying assumptions would still be 
valid and such strategies would consistently fail. 
 In mid-January of 1992, The Star, a national tabloid specializing in stories about the 
personal lives of celebrities, published a series of stories in which Gennifer Flowers claimed 
to have had a 12-year affair with Bill Clinton. Again, the people will think you are scum 
strategy seemed to work. The story was initially downplayed in the mainstream press in part 
because the allegations were 2 years old, having been first made public while Clinton was 
governor. It was also initially ignored because The Star, described in one mainstream 
newspaper article as better than most of the national tabloids but still a step below The 
National Enquirer, was deemed an unreliable source.8  
However, reflecting the proliferation of media outlets, the increasing difficulty of 
distinguishing between mainstream and nonmainstream press, and the embarrassing 
existence of tape-recorded conversations between Flowers and Clinton, the story would not 
go away. Fox news affiliates and the New York Post both picked up the item (being both 
owned by Rupert Murdoch, they provide evidence for supporters of Hilary Clinton’s claims 
of a vast right-wing conspiracy, VRWC hereafter), and the “big feet” pressThe Wall Street 
Journal and The Boston Globe–assigned reporters to the story. 
Bill and Hillary Clinton’s decision to directly address the issue by appearing on 60 
Minutes right after the Super Bowl brought the issue more centrally into the mainstream 
press. Noting the significance of this very new strategy, Stephanopoulos (1999) said that it 
was “the media equivalent of chemotherapy. 60 Minutes was strong enough to cure usif it 
didn’t kill us first” (p. 62). The Clinton appearance helped to frame the issue for New 
Hampshire voters as a referendum on the appropriate focus of the press and politics. Despite 
CNN’s live coverage of Gennifer Flowers’s press conference the following day, at which she 
played some of the tapes, the Clintons had succeeded and the “comeback kid” was born. 
Here we have a glimpse of the ability of the public to distinguish between the entertainment 
value of disclosures (in a variety of media outlets) about the private lives of public figures 
and their perhaps dubious relevance for judging the public performance of politicians.  
Although the role of quasi-alternative media was increasing, the focus of struggle still 
centered on the mainstream press. Even though the Clintons’ efforts were successful in 
rallying public support and partially diffusing the issue, the alleged affair had now gained 
legitimacy within the mainstream press as a campaign issue. To justify their expanded 
coverage, members of the press could point to the existence of legitimate sources (e.g., the 
Clintons themselves) and to the fact that other traditional news outlets were covering the 
story. The press could also justify covering what was initially defined as a private matter by 
focusing on the issue of “lying to the public”a theme that would emerge time and again 
over the next 7 years. Interestingly enough, as the mainstream press devoted more and more 
coverage to issues of scandal, the tabloid press “suffered from these incursions on its 
turf…the National Enquirer, the Star and the Globeeach lost 30 percent in circulation from 
1991 to 1996” (Gabler, 1998, p.92). 
 At least two outcomes of the Flowers story are worth noting. First, the proliferation of 
media outlets searching for political stories and using a wide variety of approaches to 
defining what constitutes a legitimate story erodes the gatekeeping function of the 
mainstream press by making it more difficult to exercise any control over what is covered. 
 
 To hold the line when everyone, including its own middle-class readers, was already familiar with a 
story, when everyone seemed to think it was the biggest story around, would have been foolish and 
self-defeating. The Flowers disclosure was only the final station on this long road to conflation. 
(Gabler, 1998, p. 93) 
 
 Second, despite the sea changes occurring, journalists and political elites remained 
locked in a set of practices that had been defined in the social responsibility era of the press 
and assumed a continuing role for the mainstream media as gatekeepers. That is, throughout 
the Paula Jones and Monica Lewinsky scandals, journalists, editors, and political elites still 
negotiated with each other over the appropriateness of particular stories and the frames they 
would use as if the outcomes of such deliberations would still control the political 
information available to the public. 
This pattern within the mainstream press of initially ignoring and then reluctantly 
reacting to issues initially raised in the nontraditional media was also characteristic of the 
Paula Jones incident. Whereas mainstream coverage ebbed and flowed throughout most of 
1994 (driven largely by events in the civil suit) and largely disappeared throughout all of 
1995 (as a result of legal appeals that put much of the case on hold), nonmainstream 
coverage filled the gaps in this coverage, keeping the issue firmly on its agenda. 
So, initial stories about Paula Jones and Troopergate written by a Los Angeles Times 
reporter were killed by editors until the story was published by David Brock in the American 
Spectator. Providing more support for VRWC claims: Brock was infamous for his anti-Anita 
Hill stories and Clinton archenemy Clint Jackson helped sell the story. Once in the 
alternative media, the Troopergate stories forced the hand of the more mainstream Los 
Angeles Times, which then ran its reporter’s stories (Isikoff, 1999). 
Similarly, no major network covered Jones’s first press conference in 1994 held at the 
Conservative Political Action Committee’s annual convention, and neither would The 
Washington Post print Michael Isikoff’s stories that largely confirmed Jones’s accusations. 
These decisions reflected the traditional elite dominated workings of the gatekeeping model: 
debates within news organizations over the public’s right/need to know and negotiations with 
political elites over the shape and content of what is news. Of course, such machinations are 
based on the increasingly dubious assumption that it is only through the mainstream media 
that the public gets its political information.  
In his own tell-all book, Isikoff (1999) described the debates within the Post about the 
propriety of the story. If Isikoff is to believed, debate was less over whether the story was 
true (there seemed little doubt about that) but whether the public should know (the essence of 
gatekeeping): “Editors always wanted to know these things. They hardly ever wanted to 
publish them” (p. 61). Another factor in the decision of the mainstream press to curtail 
coverage of the Jones case were actions of the White House. After personally arguing with 
Isikoff, Stephanopoulos took his you are scum strategy to the next level and made a direct 
pitch to Post editor Len Downie “over crab cakes in the dining room of the Jefferson Hotel 
(Stephanopoulos, 1999, p. 270). 
In November of 1996, the American Lawyer published a long story that chastised the 
press for its failure to more fully explore the Jones case. How do we classify American 
Lawyer? Neither mainstream, conservative, nor fringe, it is published by Steven Brill, who 
used the story as a way to gain publicity and credibility for the magazine (see also footnotes 3 
and 5). Although other mainstream outlets did not bite on the American Lawyer, radio talk 
show host Don Imus did, and the Jones story began to receive regular coverage. Indeed, one 
of the things that made negotiations between Clinton and Jones’s lawyers so difficult was the 
demand by Jones for a public apology by the president that would compensate for her 
continuous “sliming” by entertainment figures such as Jay Leno, David Letterman, Howard 
Stern, and others (Isikoff, 1999). 
So, it was not until 1997 that the Paula Jones issue, which had been essentially kept alive 
for the past 3 years by the nonmainstream press and entertainment media, became an ongoing 
news story, driven largely by events surrounding the civil suit and the heating up of rhetoric 
within both the Clinton and the Jones camps. Although in some ways this increased attention 
suggests that the mainstream media had recaptured control of the political agenda, most of 
the stories were initially generated through leaks, reports, and rumors that first emerged over 
the Internet, from conservative publications, and/or from the cable talk shows. Thus, although 
the mainstream press had more firmly embraced the issue as newsworthy (the actions of 
political elites—e.g., Clinton’s hiring of lawyer Robert Bennett to handle the Jones 
case—were central to this decision), it was still reacting to an agenda that was being framed 
largely by others. Mainstream news sources such as the evening news and the prestige 
newspapers were also disadvantaged by the collapse of the normal twice-a-day news cycle 
and its rapid replacement with 24-hour-a-day breaking news (Kurtz, 1998). 
At this point in the story, all semblance of a distinction between mainstream and 
alternative media sources begins to disappear as Matt Drudge appears on the scene. Using the 
Internet to publish insider tidbits about the rich, famous, and powerful, Drudge saw himself 
as the new Walter Winchell. This association is quite important because it reminds us, as 
would Bourdieu, that we need to keep the new media environment in a historical perspective 
and not overemphasize the uniqueness of developments. Gabler (1998) argued that Winchell 
is the prototype for the journalist as celebrity who blurs the lines between news and 
entertainment to become a powerful force in American public life. He traced Winchell’s 
lineage through Edward R. Murrow and Barbara Walters (who of course was the lucky 
interviewer of Monica Lewinsky). So, although Matt Drudge did not constitute a completely 
unique figure, his use of the Internet to disseminate his scoops is significant for the way it 
added a new wrinkle further undermining the gatekeeping ability of mainstream journalists. 
 Although he may have been publicly excoriated by political and media elites as the 
various Clinton scandals played out, he was embraced by those very same elites as the next 
big thing. Isikoff met Drudge when he was squired around the Newsweek offices by editor 
Howard Fineman. Indeed, Isikoff actually swapped information with him about the Starr 
investigation because “I, of course, couldn’t let it look as if Drudge knew something I didn’t” 
(Isikoff, 1999, p. 145). Fineman himself met Drudge at a dinner party in his honor hosted by 
David Brock and attended by “a star-studded cast of political and journalistic notables” 
(Isikoff, 1999, p. 145). In any event, by combining the sensibilities of a gadfly; a seemingly 
unquenchable hunger for celebrity, acceptance, and power; and the opportunities for gaining 
access to a wide public presented by the Internet, more than any other figure in the Clinton 
saga, Drudge undermined the gatekeeping function of the mainstream press and political 
elites. Indeed, the Agence France Presse, the world’s oldest wire service, listed Drudge’s 
breaking of the Lewinsky story on January 19, 1998, as one of the 10 key dates in 
20th-century media history (Grossman, 1999). 
In July 1997, lawyers for President Clinton and Paula Jones were on the verge of a 
settlement that would have effectively ended the Kathleen Willey and most likely the Monica 
Lewinsky scandals before they started. At the same time, Isikoff, after being tipped off by 
Jones’s lawyers and helped by the Clinton-conspiracy Guarino Report (more VRWC 
evidence), was hot on the trail of Kathleen Willey but consistent with the strictures of the 
mainstream press, had little faith that his story would be printed. However, Drudge broke the 
story on July 29th, and the leak exploded the Willey story into the mainstream media and 
effectively ended the negotiations between the president and Jones’s lawyers.  
Isikoff (1999) captured the frustration of mainstream reporters, which would of course 
repeat itself in the Lewinsky story. Internal negotiations within the magazine over whether to 
publish his story reflected the old assumptions of media gatekeeping. Editors and reported 
wanted to make sure that “information would hold up if and when Newsweek decided there 
was something worth sharing with the public [italics added]” (pp. 234-235). Drudge’s leak 
revealed the futility and outdatedness of such deliberations. 
 
Only a few days earlier, we had no intention of writing a story about Kathleen Willey. Were weas some 
critics later chargedusing a scurrilous Internet gossip columnist as a pretext for publishing something 
that didn’t meet the magazine’s usual standards for what is fit to print? It was a tough call. (p. 155) 
 
 By January 1998, as another leak by Drudge aired the content of another Isikoff 
Newsweek story that had been spiked, the Clinton presidency stood at the brink of dissolution 
rocked by another sex scandal and another controversial Star(r) reportthis time that of 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starrfocusing on an alleged affair between President Clinton 
and a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. Isikoff’s (1999) account of the weekend when 
the Drudge Report broke the story is a surreal commentary on the complete obliteration of 
the boundaries between the mainstream press and other media outlets. After losing the battle 
with his editors to run the story, he found out about Drudge’s leak and rebuked Bill Kristol 
for referring to it on the Sunday television talk show ABC This Week: “How could he rely on 
anything that guy writes?” (p. 340). Isikoff wondered, “Will the story break out into the 
mainstream?” (p. 341). When the story did break out on Tuesday, Newsweek decided to post 
Isikoff’s original story on its Web site. Here we are truly through the looking glass of the new 
media environment and the hyperreality of the modern political spectacle as a reporter who 
knows the story to be true rebukes those who talk about it on television because they rely on a 
“bottom-feeding” source and wonders if it will make it into the mainstream after it has been 
on television-a medium on which lsikoff himself appears regularly (he cut short an earlier 
meeting with Linda Tripp to appear on Chris Mathews’s Hardball)because it’s not truly a 
“real” event until it has made it into the mainstream print press (albeit the Internet version of 
the magazine). 
 For all the attention generated by the Paula Jones case, it paled in comparison to the 
explosion of coverage in January of 1998. The last 10 days of that month generated more 
newspaper stories around the country than all the articles and commentaries written on all the 
eruptions from Connie Hamzey to Kathleen Willey combined. Although journalists continued 
to periodically stop and reflect on whether this was a topic worthy of this amount of attention 
or to lament the decline in journalistic standards in reporting, they had by this time 
succumbed to the new system. Matt Drudge emerged as a prominent commentator on 
“serious” television shows such as Meet the Press (where he appeared with Isikoff). At the 
same time, journalists and news reporters frequently appeared on talk shows. Following the 
lead of Newsweek, mainstream publications such as The New York Times and The 
Washington Post “prepublished” and updated their stories on the Internet. Other news (and 
sometimes non-news) outlets became sources for their stories. The commentary of comedians 
such as Jay Leno, David Letterman, Bill Maher, and Al Franken became the topic of stories 
on the evening news and in the major daily newspapers while the news stories broadcast or 
published that day were the subject of that evening’s monologue. 
 With Clinton-Lewinsky, all notions that one could make clear-cut distinctions between 
serious and less serious news outlets, even between news and non-news genres had been 
effectively destroyed. Whether one started the day by listening to National Public Radio or 
Howard Stern, by watching Good Morning America or CNN, by reading The New York Times 
or the Star, the topic was the same. Viewers of daytime talk shows such as NBC’s Leeza 
could watch a panel consisting of a Washington newspaper correspondent, a public relations 
expert who works with celebrities, a gossip columnist, and a television star who had gone 
through a very public divorce discuss the way Hillary Clinton was handling the media 
spotlight. An Internet search under the heading “Monica Lewinsky” would produce more 
than 12,000 options ranging from the latest news report, to “the Monica Lewinsky Fan Club,” 
to the pornographic Web site “Monica Ate My Balls.” (In fact, Internet search engines have 
become one of the more significant gatekeepers in the new media environment and their 
operations, although little studied, hold increasing political significance.9) E-mails sharing the 
latest Clinton/Lewinsky jokes were commonplace in offices around the country. The early 
evening local and national news competed not only with each other but with the Drudge 
Report (50,000 hits per day at the height of the scandal, a large proportion of which were 
mainstream journalists themselves) and television tabloid shows such as Entertainment 
Tonight, Hard Copy, and A Current Affair (the latter two whose names had taken on 
interesting double meanings) for the latest details and interpretations of the scandal. 
Primetime dramas and comedies either made direct references to the scandal or their usual 
fare of sex, infidelity, power, and conspiracy took on new meanings. Cable talk shows such 
as Hardball and Rivera Live and all-news cable networks such as MSNBC became virtually 
all Monica, all the time. Late evening news was no different, to be followed into the wee 
hours by more “discussion” of the scandal by news anchor Ted Koppel; comedians Jay Leno, 
David Letterman, Bill Maher, and Conan O’Brien; and cross-over personalities such as 
sportscaster-turned newscaster Keith Oberman. One could literally spend 24 hours a day 
watching, listening to, and reading about the Clinton scandal. More tellingly, one could do so 
without ever tuning in or picking up a traditional news source. 
 Reflecting the ability of the new media to obliterate both time and space, the story 
flowed across national borders, where it also crossed genres and audiences. For example, 
whereas “serious” commentary in Israeli newspapers focused on the impact of the scandal on 
prospects for a Middle East peace settlement, commercials for spot removers on Israeli 
television spoofed the scandal—private detectives searching Lewinsky’s closet are distressed 
to find a can of the advertiser’s spot remover lying next to “the” dress. Similarly, the scandal 
both dominated the mainstream British press and was also used in commercials to sell a 
newspaper’s weekly job listings (a Clinton impersonator asks his aid why he should be 
interested in the new job listings when he already has a job. After a pause, he says, “Oh yeah, 
maybe I should take a look”). 
Films such as Wag The Dog, Primary Colors, and An American President or television 
shows such as Spin City became direct commentaries on the current state of politics, many 
became part of the discourse about the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. For example, when the 
United States bombed a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant that was allegedly manufacturing 
chemical weapons, Kenneth Starr was asked by a reporter whether he had seen Wag The Dog 
(in which a fictional president creates a fake war as a diversion from a sex scandal) and if he 
saw any parallels. If he didn’t, Saddam Hussein did, and earlier in the year, Iraqi television 
broadcast a pirated copy of the movie at the height of tensions over U.N. weapons inspections 
and U.S. threats to launch air strikes. And an MSNBC story noted that a statement by 
President Clinton explaining his initial concerns over ordering the strike was eerily similar to 
one made by the fictional president in An American President under similar circumstances. 
And what of the public in this new, multiaxial environment? In some ways, as we argued 
earlier, this environment is evocative of the libertarian era, in which multiple points of view 
exist, the line between opinion and fact is less distinct, and as J. S. Mill (1859/1975) 
suggested, the “truth” emerges from its collision with error in the process of public 
deliberation. The substance of the issue aside, the ability of a nation of 250 million people (to 
say nothing of the worldwide audience) to follow the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal through a 
host of different media and genres (from straight news, to talk shows, to satire) and then 
discuss it and the variety of more foundational issues it raises with fellow citizens is a 
remarkable occurrence. Many aspects of the Internet, such as its interactivity, scope, and the 
ability for all users to become producers as well as consumers of information and opinion, 
contribute to this deliberative process. Even more mundane technology such as remote 
controls and VCRs allow the public to play a more active role in creating their own narratives 
out of the already hyperreal media discourse. 
In essence, elements of the current media environment give the public new ways as a 
collectivity and as separate social, economic, political, and cultural communities to 
potentially become one (or more) of the axes of power in what Fiske (1996) described 
metaphorically as “a river of discourses”: 
 
At times the flow is comparatively calm; at others, the undercurrents, which always disturb the depths 
under even the calmest surface, erupt into turbulence. Rocks and promontories can turn its currents into 
eddies and counter-currents, can change its direction or even reverse its flow. Currents that had been 
flowing together can be separated, and one turned on the other, producing conflict out of calmness. These 
are deep, powerful currents…and these discursive “topics” swirl into each other--each is muddied with the 
silt of the others, none can now in unsullied purity or isolation. Media events are sites of maximum 
visibility and maximum turbulence. (p. 7) 
 
Certainly the public’s reaction to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal could be interpreted from 
this neolibertarian (Fiske would describe it as postmodern) perspective. The evidence from 
public opinion surveys and media market analyses suggests that the public followed the 
ongoing story (through a variety of media) and knew the central issues and “facts.” At the 
same time and despite the efforts of the president’s supporters and detractors to frame the 
issue, a large majority of the public created its own narrative consistent with neither group’s 
interpretation: The president had an affair and lied about it to the public and in his deposition 
and testimony (despite his denials). This affair (and the other allegations of sexual 
misconduct) has damaged their belief in Clinton’s moral character (despite his attempts to 
salvage his image). At the same time and despite the concerted efforts of Clinton’s detractors, 
they consistently separated this issue from his ability to govern, said that this was essentially 
a private matter, and opposed resignation or impeachment, while favoring either dropping the 
issue or some form of censure. From this perspective, the large audiences for scandal 
coverage only indicates that the public found the issue entertaining and took pleasure (in a 
wide variety of ways) from following it but managed to keep the story in a more reasonable 
perspective than either the mainstream media or political elites. In many ways, it was 
precisely the undeniably entertaining and amusing aspects of this story that the mainstream 
were unable to address as they hypocritically exploited it: 
 
The news journalists themselves obviously couldn’t admit this. They spent the first weeks of the Lewinsky 
story desperately trying to justify their coverage of it by insisting that it was a matter of grave national 
concern. But the public knew better. With President Clinton’s approval rating high and with his alleged 
behavior having demonstrably had no effect on his ability to govern, the public, in television ratings and 
polls, made two things clear: (1) they loved hearing about the Lewinsky affair, but (2) they believed the 
affair had no relevance to anything beyond itself. It was, in short, entertainment. (Gabler, 1998, p. 94) 
 
Although in the end the scandal certainly eroded the president’s ability to govern, 
negative public reaction to the impeachment proceedings and the outcomes of the 1998 
elections illustrate the inability of the president, his opponents, or the mainstream press to 
control and shape events. 
The ability of the public to participate in this deliberation without being fully 
manipulated by it results, we would argue, from the media environment discussed throughout 
this article, especially the declining ability of mainstream journalists and political elites to act 
as gatekeepers and agenda setters. In this environment, one could turn to the news (in the 
papers, on television, or over the Internet) to get the latest facts and rumors. One could watch 
Geraldo Rivera defend the president night after night and/or Chris Matthews attack him (both 
doing so in the context of talk shows that included guests with various points of view). One 
could watch the issue being described in grave legal and constitutional terms on C-Span, in 
human and humorous terms on The Tonight Show, or in a mix of both on Politically Incorrect. 
One could find out how people across the world interpret our apparent obsession. And one 
could access primary sources (e.g., the Clinton testimony or the Starr report).  
And yet there is another side to this new information environment. Regardless of Bill 
Clinton’s survival and the public repudiation of many of his Republican adversaries, the 
ability of the administration’s opponents to capture the media agenda (if not fully capture 
how that agenda was framed) succeeded in turning the public’s and the government’s 
attention away from other, more substantive issues, preventing the Clinton administration 
from taking advantage of what was arguably a very favorable political and economic climate. 
In addition, what we interpreted earlier as the public’s fairly reasoned deliberation about the 
Clinton-Lewinsky scandal has an alternative explanation: The attraction is driven by the same 
kind of morbid fascination that leads to rubbernecking when there is a traffic accident. In this 
interpretation of the public mood, the hyperreality is more hyper than real and there is little 
difference between the public’s attention to and discussion about this issue than when a 
particularly exciting episode of ER or The X-Files is aired. The fact that the public’s reaction 
to charges of sexual harassment in the Paula Jones or Katherine Wiley cases or to alleged 
campaign finance violations by the Clinton-Gore campaign were similar to that expressed in 
the Monica Lewinsky case (yes, he/they probably did it; everybody does it; the economy is 
ok for me; nothing can be done to fix these things; so let’s move on) suggests that the current 
media and political environments are contributing to a rising cynicism rather than a rebirth of 
reasoned deliberation.  
Determining which of these interpretations (or more likely what combination of them) is 
the more accurate is the crucial issue facing students of media and politics as well as anyone 
concerned about the current and future state of democracy. To accomplish these tasks, we 
need new perspectives on and theories of the press in a democratic society that take account 
of the dramatically changing media environment. 
 
CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF MONICA AND RETHINKING THE NEW MEDIA 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 What changed between 1992 and 1998 reveals much about the new ways in which 
politics, the media, political elites, and the public interact. It seems very clear that any 
approach to political communication based on clear-cut distinctions between fact and opinion 
or public affairs and entertainment cannot hope to understand the mediated politics of the end 
of the 20th century. 
The new media environment presents a challenge to mainstream journalists in their 
gatekeeping role as agenda setter and issue framer. It is telling that throughout the 
Clinton-Lewinsky scandal and its precursors, the mainstream press frequently paused to 
reflect on its own role and to try to clarify (for itself and the public) what constitutes 
newsworthiness.10 But the existence of multiple news outlets (cable news/talk shows, radio 
call-in shows, conservative publications, i.e., American Spectator), semi-news outlets (Hard 
Copy, A Current Affair), entertainment media (The Tonight Show, Late Night With David 
Letterman), and the Internet (most notably, the Drudge Report) all kept the issue alive and 
pressured both the mainstream press and political elites to respond. 
 One result was the collapse of anything like a daily news cycle. Although reporters still 
struggled to move the story forward, they did so in an environment where that story was 
being updated every 20 minutes, The predictable result was less time to reflect on what they 
were doing, more mistakes, and a reduced ability to correct those mistakes, Never has the 
trade-off between getting it first and getting it right been so clear. Although E. Katz (1993) 
noted this process for CNN during its coverage of the Gulf War, by 1998 the pressure to 
broadcast as well as gather news continuously had spread well beyond the cable news 
networks. 
 In short, in the 6-year period from the publication of the Star exposé to the publication of 
the Starr report, mainstream journalism lost its position as the central gatekeeper of the 
nation’s political agenda. For most of that period (at least until 1997 and arguably until 1998), 
the mainstream news media attempted to play its traditional role and found that the political 
agenda was being set without them. More recently, it has adapted to the new rules by 
increasingly mimicking the form and substance of its competitors. In this new environment 
however, it seems unlikely that any strategy will return the traditional news sources to the 
preeminent position they once held. The new multiaxial reality is that much as political 
parties lost their place as the central actor in electoral politics, instead becoming one of 
several sites where politics occurs, traditional journalists are now one among many agenda 
setters and issue framers within the media. 
 Just as the new information environment created multiple axes of power within the media, 
it also created new axes among the political actors who operate to shape the media’s agenda. 
Under the social responsibility theory, authoritative sources were traditionally limited to a 
largely mainstream political, economic, and social elite: elected officials, spokespersons for 
major interest groups, and so forth. These sources, although attempting to shape the media 
environment in ways that would benefit their particular political agenda, understood and 
largely operated within the rules of traditional journalism. But the new media environment 
with its multiple points of access and more continuous news cycle has increased the 
opportunities for less mainstream individuals and groups to influence public discourse. 
 As Fiske (1996), Lipsitz (1990), and others noted, this can sometimes lead to giving a 
voice to traditionally disempowered cultures and classes; however, it can also, as in the case 
of the Clinton scandals, lead to the capture of the political agenda by arguably 
unrepresentative interests. Although perhaps falling short of Hillary Clinton’s VRWC claim, 
as we have noted earlier, from the start, the attacks on Bill Clinton’s financial and sexual 
behavior were supported by individuals and groups associated with the religious and partisan 
right as well as by individuals who had a more personal vendetta against the president. The 
religious right as well played an important role in maintaining the momentum of the 
anti-Clinton campaign.11 
 Three points are of particular importance regarding this loosely knit network of 
conservative foundations, public officials, private citizens, and media organizations. First, 
although they undoubtedly had some tacit support among more mainstream conservatives and 
Republicans, by and large they operated outside the normal chain of command and often 
were viewed with suspicion and were publicly opposed by their more moderate and/or 
politically powerful colleagues. This was essentially an insurgency movement by the far right 
that was able to influence the public agenda through newly emerging axes of mediated 
political power. Although generally failing in more traditional institutional settings (e.g., the 
courts), they succeeded in influencing the political agenda by exploiting the new media 
environment through first using the right wing press, then the nonmainstream press (the 
Internet, cable talk shows, etc.), and ultimately the mainstream press.12 
 The larger point is not that the new media environment favors conservative 
causescertainly the Clinton administration and its supporters were effective at using some 
of the same techniques in getting its side of the story into the liberal, nonmainstream, and 
mainstream press (one need only consider the concerted efforts to damage the reputations of 
Gennifer Flowers, Paula Jones, Katherine Wiley, and to a lesser extent Monica Lewinsky or 
the revelations of sexual misconduct by the president’s critics). Neither is it to suggest that 
for different issues, more than one new axis of power might emerge (e.g., imagine how the 
Clinton scandals might have played out if feminists had played a more visible, active role). 
Rather, it is to suggest this new media environment and the hyperreality it produces have 
created new, multiple, and shifting axes of political power. 
 An example of the ways in which the new media environment was actually used by the 
Left is provided by coverage in 2002 of Trent Lott’s statements at Strom Thurmond’s 100th 
birthday party, which ultimately led to the Mississippian’s withdrawal from his position as 
senate majority leader. Lott’s endorsement of the South Carolinian’s 1948 segregationist 
presidential campaign was kept on the agenda after it had faded from the mainstream press 
largely by Internet sites, especially Josh Marshall’s Talking Point. As Marshall said, 
 
This was a story that the [established] press in DC was very well suited to miss, because even for people 
who wish it were otherwise, it’s been understood for a long time that you’ve got various conservative 
Republicans who go in for this kind of stuff. Also, the way daily journalism works, a story has a 24-hour 
audition to see if it has legs, and if it doesn’t get picked up, that’s it. (Burkeman, 2002, p. 13) 
 
 At the very least, the new media environment decisively shifts the nature of arguments 
about what the public has the right to know. Under the social responsibility model, such 
debates are matters of negotiation among elites. Political elite spin doctors such as George 
Stephanopoulos and James Carville negotiated with mainstream journalists to keep the 
supposedly private affairs (literally) of the president out of the media. Reporters and editors 
debated among themselves if and when there was something worth sharing with the public. 
Lawyers for the accusers and the accused negotiated legal settlements that prevented anyone 
from talking to the press or the public. Whether we ultimately believe that the public ought to 
know whether the president of the United States exposed himself to Paula Jones, groped 
Kathleen Willey, and received oral sex from Monica Lewinsky or not, such debates are no 
longer likely to remain within elite circles. Instead, debates in the new media environment 
will center on the ability of the public and elites (political and media) to openly negotiate and 
construct a meaningful boundary between public and private life, entertainment and serious 
political issues, fact and opinion, and so forth that can withstand the public disclosure of 
information that would have remained hidden under earlier models of political 
communication. 
We close by noting a fundamental objection to our argument: How generalizable is 
coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal for political communication in general? After all, 
it might be argued a juicy sex scandal is tailor-made for crossing the boundaries between 
different types of media and for capturing the public’s attention. Yet, we would argue that the 
changes in gatekeeping and their impact on media coverage of all political events, especially 
crises, are a permanent feature of the new media environment. The changes in media 
gatekeeping are clearly evident in coverage of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In a piece that 
echoes many of the issues we raise with respect to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, on October 
10, 2001, Caryn James wrote in The New York Times, 
 
Instead of a monolithic American point of view, the audience today is receiving a global perspective, 
seeing news from the BBC and from Al Jazeera, the Arab television station that first carried the bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda tapes. The diversity of sources exists whether the American networks want to admit it or not. 
(p. B8) 
 
She went on to note the discomfort of electronic journalists with this multiplicity of 
perspectives: 
 
Almost all American anchors have seemed flummoxed by what to do with so much information from so 
many perspectives…. Today there is not one propaganda voice but many, including that of the United 
States…. The anchors have done little to put comments from American pundits and officials into 
perspective. The networks are overloaded with military analysis, mostly retired officers who do less 
analyzing than cheerleading. (p. B8) 
 
James ended by addressing the issue of how individual citizens will respond to these changes 
and the failure of mainstream journalism to adapt to them in terms that reflect both a concern 
with practice and a willingness to see that the tools of critical analysis can be drawn from a 
wide range of sources, not just what is labeled news. “The audience is now in the position of 
juggling multiple viewpoints, like the reader of a novel with several unreliable narrators…. 
As technology races ahead, our images outpacing our understanding, television desperately 
needs cultural analysis” (p. B8). We would argue that the ultimate ability of citizens to 
acquire the political curiosity and critical ability to interrogate information in the new media 
environment is one of the most profound questions facing American democracy in the 21st 
century. 
  
NOTES 
 
1. This article draws heavily on our (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2000) article, “Unchained 
Reaction: The Collapse of Media Gatekeeping and the Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal.” 
2. We are indebted to John Zaller for making this point. 
3. The actual quote from McLuhan (1995) is 
 
The new media are not bridges between man and nature; they are nature…. The new 
media are not ways of relating us to the old world; they are the real world and they 
reshape what remains of the old world at will. (p. 272) 
 
4. Interestingly enough, for the purposes of this article, the phrase bimbo eruption is 
usually attributed to Betsy Wright, a former Clinton chief of staff who was charged with 
investigating and undermining the credibility of his accusers. She (or at least a thinly 
disguised version of her) was played by Kathy Bates in an Academy-Award-nominated 
performance in the movie Primary Colors. 
5. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
6. The difficulty of classifying media outlets is an interesting problem. Is Penthouse a 
mainstream publication? Fifteen years ago, the answer would likely have been no, especially 
in academic and elite circles. However, as Larry Flynt and Hustler threaten to out the sexual 
escapades of conservative politicians and hence play a significant role in American politics 
(i.e., the rapid exit from the stage of incoming House Speaker Bob Livingstone), Penthouse 
begins to seem positively conservative by comparison, to say nothing of the information 
cycling and recycling on the Internet. 
7. Reflecting the difficulty of distinguishing between different media genres, we set off 
the term documentary in quotation marks. For a fascinating account of the ways in which this 
movie is less a documentary than a new form of political communication reflecting a 
carefully crafted strategy by the Clinton campaign, see Pary-Giles and Pary-Giles (1999). 
8. Again, reflecting the increasing difficulty of classifying media outlets, the National 
Enquirer’s own reputation had been enhanced and begrudgingly acknowledged by members 
of the mainstream press as a result of its reporting during the O. J. Simpson trial. 
9. See for example an interesting critical analysis of the ways in which search engines are 
becoming increasingly commercialized and the implications of this for the information their 
users are likely to recover (Rosenberg, 1999). 
10. Recent attempts by the news media to police itself also point to this crisis in defining 
journalism: for example, the firing of several reporters and columnists at the Boston Globe 
and The Washington Post for inaccurate reporting, the resignation of a local newscaster in 
protest over the hiring of talk show host Jerry Springer, the decision by ABC to not air a 
docudrama by Oliver Stone about the downing of TWA Flight 800 out of fear that it would 
confuse viewers, the ongoing criticism of public journalism by mainstream members of the 
press, and so forth. 
11. The Christian Defense Coalition contributed to the Paula Jones suit by setting up the 
Paula Jones Legal Expenses Fund. Other religious, conservative, and/or Republican 
individuals and groups such as Gilbert Davis (who had supported George Bush in 1988), the 
Legal Affairs Council (which had originally been set up to help defend Oliver North during 
the Iran-Contra scandal), and the Rutherford Institute (a not for profit that focuses on issues 
of religious freedom) also pledged contributions to aid in Paula Jones’s defense. 
12. The Republican losses in the 1988 congressional elections, resulting in part from 
their failed strategy regarding the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, and the subsequent meltdown 
within the GOP leadership point to the extent to which mainstream members of the party had 
lost control of their own agenda. 
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